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Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan,
is more than a collection of original articles written by some leading figures on
that issue. It is one of the most important contributions within the contemporary
debate in analytic philosophy on personal identity published in the last 20 years.
The volume is a collection of 12 articles (plus one reply) on personal identity,
involving a number of different topics such as the metaphysics of human beings,
the constitutive criteria of personal identity, and persistence over time. The articles
are grouped into three sections and are prefaced by a complete and clearly argued
introduction to the general problem (by Georg Gasser and Mathias Stefan). Besides
the impressive variety of issues covered by the contributors, the connecting thread
of the collection remains the distinction between “simple” and “complex” views
about personal identity, and hence the fundamental simplicity/complexity of perso-
nal identity over time. Roughly put, a complex view considers personal identity as
being made up of something else, while a simple view takes personal identity as
irreducible to any simpler relation or consisting in anything but itself. Our being
fundamentally either complex or simple entities represents in other terms the key
question of the whole volume.
In the first section, “Framing the question”, David Barnett, Eric T. Olson,
Ryan Wasserman, and Harold W. Noonan deal with the very meaning of “com-
plexity” and “simplicity” applied to personal identity, and draw a valuable
taxonomy of the different complex and simple accounts of personal persistence.
In the second section, “Arguments for and against simplicity”, Richard
Swinburne, Sydney Shoemaker, E. J. Lowe, and Martine Nida-Rümelin, discuss
whether any informative condition might be metaphysically constitutive of personal
identity over time, each arguing for one side of the simplicity/complexity dichotomy.1
1 In particular, on the one hand Swinburne, Lowe and Nida-Rümelin support a simple account
of personal identity, respectively by accepting a strong form of mind-body dualism (Swinburne),
by rejecting any criterion of identity for persons as individual substances (Lowe), and by
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Finally, the four essays within the section “Reconsidering simplicity” – by
Lynne Rudder Baker, Christian Kanzian, Dean Zimmerman, and Hud Hudson –
advance innovative arguments in support of the non-analyzability of personal
identity, and in defense of a renewed simple approach.
Among all these fascinating contributions, I would like to focus on the
characterization of the distinction between complex and simple views, in
Olson’s “In search of the simple view”, which is a paradigmatic example of
how to frame a philosophical problem without any preconceptions. Olson’s
conclusion is particularly challenging for it seems to reject the entire conceptual
framework of the volume, by rejecting the very possibility of a determinate
characterization of the distinction between complex and simple views on perso-
nal identity. If Olson is right that no characterization of the simple/complex
dualism is satisfactory then much of the discussion about personal persistence
needs to be reframed:
The trouble is not merely that there are hard cases – views of personal identity that resist
classification as either simple or complex – but that no answer even gets all the easy cases
right. […] If there is such a doctrine as the simple view, it is certainly not what we thought
it was. The debate over personal identity has been systematically misdescribed (pp. 44–45).
Olson argues in particular against a traditional description of the complex/
simple distinction drawn in terms of the existence or nonexistence of any
constitutive criterion of personal identity over time. According to this kind of
account (endorsed, among others, by Noonan)2 the distinction between complex
and simple views could be reduced to a dispute over the existence of a some-
what informative, necessary and sufficient condition for diachronic personal
identity, i. e. a completion (Φ) of the formula
(1) necessarily, if x is a person at time t and y exists at another time t*, x = y if
and only if (Φ)
where (Φ) does not presuppose the identity it is meant to give conditions for.
In other words, personal identity would be complex if some other facts (e. g.
memory, consciousness, bodily continuity, etc.) can serve as the informative,
pointing out our being directly and non-conceptually aware of ourselves as subjects of experi-
ence. On the other hand, Shoemaker defends his famous neo-Lockean theory of personal
identity that rejecting any circularity objection, maintains that it is the relation between
conscious states of a person that constitutes their belonging «to one and the same person»
(p. 133).
2 See Noonan (2003, 94–95).
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necessary and sufficient conditions for personal persistence; while it would be
simple if the only necessary and sufficient conditions (Φ) that might correctly
complete (1) are trivial and uninformative. Following such an account, the com-
plex/simplex dichotomy would be reduced to the distinction between
Criterialism and Anti-Criterialism about personal identity. Criterialism maintains
that there is some informative completion of formula (1), while Anti-Criterialism
claims that the only true version of formula (1) is:
(1a) necessarily, if x is a person at time t and y exists at another time t*, x = y
if and only if x= y.3
In order to reject such a widely accepted characterization of the complex/simple
view, Olson points out that some accounts of personal persistence that are
intuitively classified as “simple” are nonetheless “criterialist”. He considers, in
particular, the “Cartesian approach” about personal identity – endorsed for
instance by Swinburne4 – whose core idea seems to be that x at t and y at t*
are the same person if and only if they have the same soul. According to Olson,
an appeal to the condition of “having the same soul” must count as a criterion of
personal identity in virtue of its being far from trivial (since it tells «us some-
thing about human people in particular», presupposing moreover the existence
of souls), or uninformative (since it does not presuppose the identity it ought to
explain, for «one need not know whether x is y before knowing whether x has
y’s soul» (p. 50)).
Nevertheless, Olson claims that the Cartesian view is not usefully counted as
complex because it does not give conditions for personal identity involving
psychological or physical continuity of any sort. For this reason, it seems that
the simplicity of personal identity cannot be accurately explained by the lack of
any informative condition constituting personal persistence. Thus, according to
Olson, we are better off setting aside the simple/complex dichotomy and focus-
ing instead on the distinction between criterialist and anti-criterialist accounts of
personal persistence, and the existence of any informative and constitutive
condition (Φ) that makes the formula (1) true.
Although I agree with Olson that we should focus on the existence of criteria
of personal identity over time, there are two possible lines of response to his
argument that are worth pointing out.
3 Where the condition “x = y” represents the simplest, trivial, and uninformative condition for
diachronic identity.
4 See Swinburne (1984).
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First, I wonder whether the “soul-based account” of personal identity over
time actually produces a problematic tension between Criterialism and simpli-
city. If on the one hand we accept Olson’s claim that Cartesianism is a proper
criterion of personal identity, I do not understand why we should take
Cartesianism as a simple, instead of a complex view.5 This kind of solution
might appear unconvincing, but it would be perfectly consistent, disentangling
the simplicity-cum-criteria tension within a dualist account.
On the other hand, another way to solve the discordance pointed out by
Olson may consist in claiming that Cartesianism is a kind of Anti-Criterialism
(even if in a “weak sense”).6 One might refuse to grant that a soul-based
condition of identity over time represents a proper criterion for personal identity,
by maintaining that it is an uninformative condition. In particular, even though
the condition is not trivial (since it tells something about the way we persist),
one might argue that a soul-based condition lacks any concrete informative
aspects, since it presupposes an a priori identification of the essence of human
persons with their souls. In other words, by presupposing that a human person
is a human soul, the soul-based condition would end up being uninformative,
even if this ontological fact itself is neither transparent nor obvious.7 Here is an
analogy: saying that Hesperus is Phosphorus does not count as an informative
astronomical account of what Hesperus is qua heavenly body, even if the
identity claim is non-trivial.8 On the same way, saying that x at t and y at t*
are the same if and only if they have the same soul does not count as an
informative account of personal identity over time, even if the identity between
a person and his soul is non-trivial.
As things currently stand, I do not think Olson’s argument does enough to
undermine the plausibility of characterizing the complex/simple distinction in
terms of the criterialist/anti-criterialist distinction.
5 On that point, see the account given by Noonan of Swinburne’s approach in his essay
(pp. 86–87).
6 Speaking about a “weak Anti-Criterialism”, I would like to distinguish it from some kinds of
“strong Anti-Criterialism” – supported for instance in Merricks (1998) – according to which
personal identity is absolutely unanalyzable and primitive.
7 Given the controversial relation between epistemology and ontology, I am not going to deal
with the epistemological argument for the uninformative-ness of the soul-based condition.
Roughly said, this argument claims that the soul-based condition of personal identity over
time is nothing but an ad hoc, uninformative solution to the persistence question, since we
would need to know whether x and y are the same person before we could know whether they
have the same soul, and since no characterization in terms of (at least in principle) observable
facts appears conceivable.
8 I am grateful to Shea Musgrave for the analogy.
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Second, I think that Olson’s argument does not exclude the possibility of at
least partly characterizing the complex/simple distinction in terms of the exis-
tence of constitutive conditions of personal persistence. Indeed, even accepting
that the general division between complex and simple views on personal iden-
tity does not correspond to the debate over the existence of informative criteria,
it seems reasonable that the former debate at least includes the latter, even if it is
not reducible to it. It is reasonable to think that the distinction between complex
and simple views can be represented in several possible ways, one of which is
the dispute over the existence of criteria for personal identity over time.
Of course, one may reply that a “plural characterization” of the complex/
simple distinction does not solve Olson’s worries, as it just makes the division
even more complicated. However, no single characterization of the distinction
appears to be immune to counterexamples. Take for example a Parfitian account
of this division, which takes complex views to be a form of reductionism.9
According to this view, a complex approach claims that personal identity is
reducible to more fundamental properties and relations (among memories, for
example), while a simple view denies any reduction of this sort. But consider the
so-called “first-personal approach”,10 where personal identity is understood in
terms of the persistence of a conscious first-person perspective. Since there is no
other way to characterize one’s first-person perspective than through one’s first-
person perspective, and the notion of a first-person perspective presupposes
personal identity (i. e., it is the conscious perspective of a person), this condition
cannot figure in a truly reductive analysis and thus the account would be
“simple” on the Parfitian version of the distinction.
However, I find it rather misleading to classify this sort of psychological
account of persistence as simple. Because it analyzes personal identity over time
in terms of determinate psychological features it should be classified as com-
plex, regardless of whether these psychological features themselves can be
further analyzed. The condition itself may be simple, but personal identity is
not if it can be characterized in distinctively psychological terms.
Because no single account seems to be adequate, I think we cannot rule out
the possibility of explaining the complex/simple distinction in terms of different
(and somewhat overlapping) characterizations, one of which might be Parfitian.
However, I agree with Olson on one important idea: focusing on the problem of
criteria, and hence on the existence of any informative, necessary and sufficient
9 See Parfit (1982, 227), and then Zimmerman’s essay in the volume here reviewed (pp. 206–207).
10 On that issue, see Baker’s remarkable essay in this collection (pp. 179–191), whose psycho-
logical account of personal persistence is explained in terms of “enjoying first-person
thoughts”.
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condition for personal identity over time, represents the best way to handle the
persistence question.
Finally, I would like to point out another interesting aspect of the book,
namely the increased appreciation it demonstrates towards simple (anti-
criterialist) accounts of personal identity over time, an approach that has been
somewhat disparaged in the past decades within the philosophical debate in
favor of criterialist accounts of personal persistence. In this volume, most con-
tributors appear sympathetic towards a simple account of personal persistence
and offer several arguments in favor of it. These include Wasserman’s indeter-
minacy argument (p. 63ff), Swinburne’s dualistic and soul-based account of
persistence (p. 105ff), Lowe’s defense of a substantialist approach that treats
persons as unanalyzable in virtue of their being “simple substances”, or “selves”
(p. 137ff), Nida-Rümmelin’s account of the fundamental role of a direct, non-
conceptual awareness of ourselves as subjects of experience (p. 157ff); and
Kanzian’s denial of any reduction of person to a “sortal term” (p. 192ff).
Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? represents an extraordinary contribu-
tion to the metaphysics of personal identity. It succeeds in bringing together
some traditional opponents within the contemporary debate and will contribute
to the continued persistence of interest in the metaphysics of personal identity
by offering some innovative arguments for old positions alongside novel per-
spectives. It will no doubt be a work of fundamental importance for any future
research on the metaphysics of personhood.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Eric Olson and Georg Gasser for detailed discus-
sion and helpful comments.
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